First, what is the Sadam Hussein problem? Sadam Hussein and his Baathist followers believe it is their destiny to remake Baghdad into the capital of a unified Middle East. To overwhelm neighbors they need weapons of mass destruction and all they need is the to get weapons of mass destruction are brains, money and the inclination. Killing Sadam Hussein doesn't eliminate the brains, money or inclination.

Chinese, European and American brains and technology are for sale, if the price is right, so even brains aren't absolutely necessary. Only money and the inclination are necessary in the final analysis. We can't eliminate the inclination for regional and world dominance from a country and a people who have billions of dollars, But we can eliminate the billions of dollars. And we can eliminate much of the strategic location.

Let America and its allies recognize Kurdish Iraq and Shiite Iraq as independent countries. Let the boundaries of the new countries include three fourths of the oil reserves of Iraq. Let's provide them with captured military equipment, with air cover and with technical assistance.

In exchange the new countries should agree to pay on half of the war reparations due from the old unified Iraq. Central Iraq would be required to pay the remaining one half.

The division of Iraq would be supported by an overwhelming majority of the residents of the newly independent states. It would be opposed by the Sunni leaders of Iraq. Supporting the breakup would be Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Iran and possibly Jordan.

Opposing the breakup would be Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey would oppose because they would fear that Kurdish Iraq would become a base from which the Turkish Kurds would operate.

Saudis would oppose it because they are afraid of the Shiites and fear that a Shiite Iraq would become a fundamentalist satellite of Iran. Shiite Iraq would have an indefensible 700 mile land border with Saudi Arabia. It would be impossible to stop the flow or rebels and ideas across the border unless extreme measures were taken to create a Zone Sanitaire.

To deal with Turkey and Saudi Arabia the Finnish and Austrian models of pledged neutrality should be applied. In addition, Kurdish Iraq should sign a ten year treaty with Turkey to have Turkey handle all their crude and graciously accept 15% commission. This would help Turkey's financial problems and tie the Kurds to Turkey economically.

The Zone Sanitaire between Shiite Iraq and Saudi Arabia could be created by having the Shiites and the Saudis sign a treaty to jointly administer a nuclear waste dump that would extend ten miles north and south of the common border. The region is mostly uninhabited and of no agricultural value. The dumping rights would be paid for by nuclear power plants that need to store their wastes.

Beyond the waste dump the Shiites must agree to allow Saudi over flights and ground inspections. Finally the Shiites must agree to have the Saudis handle their crude exports for a 5% commission. This will tie the countries together economically and give the Saudis and incentive not to oppose the creation of Shiite Iraq.

Finally, the United Nations should pledge to protect the sovereignty of Kurdish and Shiite Iraq in exchange for 5% of the oil revenues of the two countries. The U.N. income would pay for various peace keeping and economic development programs authorized by the security Council.

1. Sadam Hussein and the Baath party would be denied the revenues required to build weapons of destruction.

2. Central Iraq would be surrounded by hostile nations that are richer, more powerful and disinclined to militarism.

3. The United Nations would be given two major sources of revenue for peace keeping and humanitarian activities.

4. The price of crude oil would be less susceptible to oligopolistic manipulation by the addition of the Kurds as significant producers and the Shiites who would agree with Iran or Saudi Arabia. Central Iraq would be less likely to withhold production because their civil expense requirements would exceed the revenues available from oil production alone.

2. American companies would participate in the development of Kurdish and Shiite oil reserves.

4. If America led in the movement to create the countries their good will would assure a market for American products.

I wrote the preceding in 1992. In 2006 Senator Biden took up the issue. Below is a counter Argument publish in the New York Times, 5/9/2006:

Op-Ed Contributor

Three Iraqs Would Be One Big Problem

E-Mail

By ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

Published: May 9, 2006

Washington

SOME pundits and politicians have been floating the idea that America consider dividing Iraq into three ethno-religious entities, saying this would not only stem the insurgency but also allow our troops an earlier exit. They are wrong: fracturing the country would not serve either Iraqi or United States interests, and would make life for average Iraqis even worse.

The first problem is that Iraq does not have a neat set of ethnic dividing lines. There has never been a meaningful census of Iraq showing exactly how its Arab Sunnis, Arab Shiites, Kurds and other factions are divided or where they live. The two elections held since the toppling of Saddam Hussein have made it clear, however, that Iraq's cities and 18 governorates all have significant minorities.

Thus any effort to divide the country along sectarian and ethnic lines would require widespread "relocations." This would probably be violent and impoverish those forced to move, leave a legacy of fear and hatred, and further delay Iraq's political and economic recovery.

Moreover, Iraq is heavily urbanized, with nearly 40 percent of the population in the multiethnic greater Baghdad and Mosul areas. We have seen in Northern Ireland and the Balkans how difficult it is to split cities, and with Iraq's centralized and failing services and impoverished economy, violence and economics cannot be separated. Deciding where Kirkuk, a key oil city, belonged would pit the Kurds against all the rest of Iraq's factions. Basra, the nation's port, is already under the sway of Shiite Islamist militias and could lose all of its secular character if the nation divided. In addition, the nation could not be partitioned without dividing the army, the security forces and the police. The regular military is largely Shiite with a significant number of Kurds. The Ministry of Interior forces are largely Shiite, and the police are hopelessly mixed with militias and local security forces that split according to local tribal, sectarian and ethnic ties. Dividing the country essentially means dividing the army and security forces and strengthening the militias � all of which would lead to more violence.

And of course, there is no way to divide Iraqi that will not set off fights over control of oil. More than 90 percent of Iraq's government revenues come from oil exports. The Sunni Arab west has no developed oil fields and thus would have no oil revenues. The Kurds want the northern oil fields, but have no legitimate claim to them and no real way to export the oil they produce (their neighbors Iran, Syria and Turkey have restive Kurdish populations of their own and thus no interest in helping Iraq's Kurds achieve self-sustaining freedom). Control of Basra would also be an issue, with various Shiite groups looking to separate and take control of the oil in the south.

Dividing Iraq would also harm regional stability and the war on terrorists. Sunni Islamist extremist groups with ties to Al Qaeda already dominate the Sunni insurgents, and division would only increase their hold over average Iraqis. And with Iraqi Sunnis cut out of oil money, Arab Sunni states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be forced to support them, if only to avoid having the Islamist extremists take over this part of Iraq.

Iran, of course, would compete for the Iraqi Shiites. The Kurds have no friends: Turkey, Iran and Syria would seek to destabilize the north and exploit the divisions between the two main Kurdish political unions. In the end, these divisions could spill over into the rest of the Middle East and the Arab world, creating a risk of local conflicts and the kind of religious tension that feeds Islamist extremism.

Washington has made serious mistakes in Iraq, and they may lead to civil war. Dividing Iraq, however, is virtually certain to make things worse. It would convey the message that America has been defeated and abandoned a nation and a people. Even if one could overlook the fact the United States effectively broke Iraq and has a responsibility to its 28 million people, it is impossible to deny that leaving behind a power vacuum in an already dangerous region is hardly a viable strategy.

Anthony H. Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is the author of "The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons."